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The issue of corporate governance has been largely debated in the literature. 
Conventionally, corporate governance is viewed either from a stakeholder or a 
shareholder perspective. This paper discusses the informational aspects of the two 
models of corporate governance. 
The role information plays in corporate governance cannot be overstated. 
Agents involved in corporate governance acquire, create, use and transmit 
information. Therefore, how the notion of knowledge is conceived is important for 
the analysis of alternative systems of corporate governance. Basically, there are 
two types of information processing: internalization and externalization. The 
internalization-based information processing system corresponds to the 
stakeholder model of corporate governance. A shareholder model of corporate 
governance relies on information externalization. Externalization of information 
is made via the market price system.  
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The issue of corporate governance has been largely debated in the literature. 
The role information plays in corporate governance cannot be overstated. Agents 
involved in corporate governance acquire, create, use and transmit information. 
Therefore how the notion of knowledge is conceived is important for the analysis 
of alternative systems of corporate governance. 
The distribution of information is of general importance for the economy. But 
it is particularly important in the context of financial relationships. The problems 
of asymmetric information and moral hazard are particularly severe in financial 
relationships. 
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In this paper we analyze the relation between information processing and 
systems of corporate governance. We begin by pointing out what is the major 
informational problem, namely moral hazard. Then we see how corporate 
governance systems attempt to mitigate the consequences of moral hazard and 
ensure that managers act in the best interest of shareholders. We distinguish 
between two large systems, information internalization – stakeholder approach – 
bank-based governance and information externalization – shareholder approach – 
market-based governance, and attempt to evaluate how they manage to alleviate 
the problem of moral hazard. 
 
2. The economics of information and moral hazard 
 
So extensive is the discussion of information in the analysis of economic 
systems that we already have a discipline – the economics of information. The 
origins of this field of science can be traced back to 1945, when Hayek published 
his seminal work “The use of knowledge in society”. Later, Arrow, Nelson and 
others continued to fuel an increasing and fascinating debate about how 
knowledge is produced and distributed among economic agents. 
One of the central issues in the economics of knowledge is the asymmetric 
information problem. It points to a situation in which one party in a transaction 
has more information than another. The party that is insulated from risk generally 
has more information about its actions and intentions than the party paying for the 
negative consequences of the risk. 
Moral hazard is related to asymmetric information, and occurs when the party 
with more information about its actions or intentions has a tendency or incentive 
to behave inappropriately from the perspective of the party with less information. 
More precisely, moral hazard arises because an individual or institution does not 
bear the full consequences of its actions, and therefore has a tendency to act less 
carefully than it otherwise would, leaving another party to bear some 
responsibility for the consequences of those actions. For example, an individual 
with insurance against automobile theft may be less vigilant about locking his car, 
because the negative consequences of automobile theft are (partially) borne by the 
insurance company. 
However a moral hazard problem occurs in making sure that managers put 
forth appropriate effort and make decisions aligned with the interests of 
shareholders.  Specifically, shareholders worry that managers may overpay 
themselves, give themselves extravagant perks, carry out unprofitable but power-
enhancing investments, and be reluctant to lay off workers that are no longer 
productive.  In this sense, managers may make decisions based on their own 
interests.  The moral hazard problem is then that managers may deceive investors 
to pursue their own goals.     60 
There are also many other situations when upper management is shielded 
from the consequences of poor decision-making. This can occur for example 
when: a manager has a sinecure position from which they cannot be readily 
removed; the manager is protected by someone higher in the corporate structure, 
such as in cases of nepotism or pet projects; funding and/or managerial status for a 
project is independent of the project's success; the failure of the project is of 
minimal overall consequence to the firm, regardless of the local impact on the 
managed division; there is no clear means of determining who is accountable for a 
given project. 
 
3. Corporate governance and moral hazard 
 
From a financial point of view, “Corporate governance deals with the ways in 
which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on 
their investment”. (Schleifer and Vichny, p. 2) Corporate governance was first 
established to combat the moral hazard issue of ensuring that managers act in the 
best interest of shareholders that arises as a result of the structure of corporations 
and the market in which they exist.  
If shareholders are in fact seeking assurance that management is acting in 
their best interest, then the concerned shareholder should have the incentive to 
monitor the corporation themselves.  However, Hart believes that monitoring is a 
public good, saying that “if one shareholder’s monitoring leads to improved 
company performance, all shareholders benefit” (Hart 1995).  The idea is that all 
shareholders will look to the other shareholders to do the monitoring for them.  In 
this case, no one investor has the incentive to monitor because any benefits they 
receive will be received by all investors, regardless of whether they invest in 
monitoring themselves.  This is a free-rider problem for monitoring among some 
shareholders; resulting in none of those shareholders choosing to monitor their 
companies.  In addition, the lack of information that shareholders have about 
performance is an impediment to enforcing accountability.  Shareholders have 
only the information presented in the financial statements and the shareholders 
generally do not have the tools to make those statements useful in monitoring. 
Hayek (1945) pointed out that the efficiency of an economic system should 
be assessed on the basis of how well that system performs in transmitting 
information among its agents. The same thing is true with regard to systems of 
corporate governance. Basically, there are two types of information processing: 
internalization and externalization. 
Internalizing information means resolving the problems of non-
appropriability, non-tradability and credibility by maintaining a close social 
distance (proximity) among all the factors involved in the functioning of the firm. 
As Schmidt and Tyrell (2005, p. 488) explain, “the problems resulting from the 
public good character of information are also less acute if the information is kept   61 
within a close relationship, or more precisely, within a network of several long 
lasting relationships”. The internalization-based information processing system 
corresponds to the stakeholder model of corporate governance. In such a system 
we cannot speak about a clear fundamental goal of the company. Rather, 
company’s management seeks to achieve a harmonization of stakeholders’ 
interests. 
In the stakeholder model of corporate governance, managerial decisions are 
overseen by a supervisory board, which includes representatives of all significant 
interests groups related to the company’s activity. This board is an essential 
element in a internalization-based information processing system or insider 
control system, because includes individuals and institutions who, given their 
close ties with the company, posses critical information which is not publicly 
available. The existence of this supervisory board suggest “what kind of 
information the board members can contribute… It is largely non-public, 
sometimes soft, and confidential and internal or inside information which relates, 
for instance, to the question of what certain management decisions would imply 
for the respective constituencies with which board members are affiliated.” 
(Schmidt and Tyrell, p. 492). 
Schmidt and Tyrell (p. 495) define the relation between information 
processing, corporate governance and financial systems as follows: “The capital 
market-based financial system and the outsider control system are complements 
and are consistent, and both rely on the externalization of information. The 
converse features make up a ban-based financial system. An insider control 
system of corporate governance belongs to and complements this system, which 
also relies on the internalization of information. Thus the nature of information is 
not only the key to understand specific corporate governance systems and their 
differences, but also the systems at large to which they belong.” 
 
4. Information and corporate governance systems 
 
Since the 19th century, many economists have argued that bank-based 
systems are better at mobilizing savings, identifying good investments, and 
exerting sound corporate control. Others, however, emphasize the advantages of 
markets in allocating capital, providing risk management tools, and mitigating the 
problems associated with excessively powerful banks. Reflecting these schisms, 
economists and policymakers continue to struggle with the relative merits of 
bank-based versus market-based financial systems in making policy decisions. 
a. The bank-based view. The bank-based financial system emphasizes the 
role of banking institutions in allocating capital. In economies like Germany and 
Japan banks are the main source of funds for corporations. The bank-based view 
highlights the positive role of banks in (i) acquiring information about firms and 
managers and thereby improving capital allocation and corporate governance.   62 
Furthermore, powerful banks can more effectively force firms to re-pay their 
debts than atomistic markets, especially in countries with weak contract 
enforcement capabilities. Thus, the bank-based view holds that banks -- 
unhampered by regulatory restrictions on their activities -- can exploit scale 
economies in information processing, ameliorate moral hazard through effective 
monitoring, form long-run relationships with firms to ease asymmetric 
information distortions, and thereby boost economic growth. Also, it can be 
argued that banks – as coordinated coalitions of investors – are better than 
uncoordinated markets at monitoring firms and reducing post-lending moral 
hazard (asset substitution). 
The bank-based view also stresses the shortcomings of market-based 
systems. Stiglitz (1985), for instance, argues that well-developed markets quickly 
and publicly reveal information, which reduces the incentives for individual 
investors to acquire information. Banks, however, mitigate this problem since 
they form long-run relationships with firms and do not reveal information 
immediately in public markets. Banks avoid the free rider problem by holding the 
loans they make. Thus, investors cannot observe banks’ activities and profit by 
mimicking them. By mainly holding loans that are not traded in financial markets, 
banks earn a profit on information collection. Although banks reduce information 
costs for savers, savers realize that banks have private information about the 
quality and the risk of the bank’s loan portfolio, and that a bank might use this 
information in a way that jeopardizes savers’ deposits. 
Proponents of the bank-based view also stress that liquid markets create a 
myopic investor climate. In liquid markets, investors can inexpensively sell their 
shares, so that they have fewer incentives to exert rigorous corporate control. 
There exists a widespread consensus that an ‘insider system’ of corporate 
governance, dominated by universal banks engaging in the full range of 
intermediation services (including brokerage and investment banking) and being 
allowed to hold equity in borrowing firms may bring a number of advantages. The 
use of strip finance (debt-equity finance) is regarded as an effective strategy for a 
bank willing to lessen moral hazard (controlling riskiness of firms’ strategy, 
monitoring and influencing managerial effort, as well as preventing distribution of 
assets to shareholders at the disadvantage of creditors and innaccuracy in reported 
return realizations), obtain access to insider information (also through interlocking 
directorates) and commit the firm to longterm, exclusive business relationship 
(especially useful in case of restructuring). 
The bank-based corporate finance and governance has a number of 
shortcomings. Most importantly, potential for conflict of interest in this system is 
endemic. A list of possible conflict-of-interest situations should include: (a) 
stuffing fiduciary accounts. A bank acting as an underwriter and unable to place 
securities in a public offering (therefore exposed to potential underwriting loss) 
may seek to ameliorate this loss by ‘stuffing’ unwanted securities into accounts   63 
managed by its investment department. (b) bankruptcy-risk transfer. A bank with 
loans to a firm whose bankruptcy risk has increased (to the private knowledge of 
the banker), may induce the firm to issue bond or equities (underwritten by its 
securities unit) to an unsuspecting public; proceeds are then used to pay-down the 
bank loan. In this case the bank transfers debt-related risk to outside investors. (c) 
third-party loans. To ensure successful underwriting, a bank may make favourable 
loans to third-party investors on condition that funds are used to purchase 
securities underwritten by the bank itself. (d) tie-ins. A bank may force a firm to 
buy its securities products under threat of credit-rationing. The problem is 
therefore that universal banks may well be able to get better information, but also 
have incentives to exploit information asymmetries to misrepresent this 
information to the market or to extract extra surplus from client firms. 
b. The market-based view. In contrast, the market-based view highlights the 
growth enhancing role of well-functioning markets in (i) fostering greater 
incentives to research firms since it is easier to profit from this information. by 
trading in big, liquid markets, (ii) enhancing corporate governance by easing 
takeovers and making it easier to tie managerial compensation to firm 
performance, and (iii) facilitating risk management. Moreover, the market-based 
view stresses problems with banks. Specifically, powerful banks can stymie 
innovation by extracting informational rents and protecting established firms with 
close bank-firm ties from competition. Furthermore, powerful banks with few 
regulatory restrictions on their activities may collude with firm managers against 
other creditors and impede efficient corporate governance. In contrast, 
competitive capital markets play a positive role in aggregating diffuse information 
signals and effectively transmitting this information to investors, with beneficial 
implications for firm financing and economic performance. 
The market-based view of corporate finance and governance stresses how 
corporate management is constrained to follow closely the interests of 
shareholders by using the concept of “market discipline”. We can explain the 
relevance of this notion thus: if stock prices are low it is hard to get external 
financing.  It is also more costly to raise new funds through new share issues.  
Managers want to manage big companies with exciting business prospects so 
want easier financing.  If stock price is too low it’s easier to be taken over. If 
internal control mechanisms such as the monitoring by board of directors fail, 
shareholders suffer and the company would become a takeover target. This 
situation arises as the company is not performing well and has a poor governance 
structure. Therefore post merger/acquisition, improved performance will surface 
coupled with a more effective governance structure. New people and new ideas 
enter the company that in essence, may make it a better company 
If the merger is successful, the bidder will most probably bring in new 
directors and CEO’s. These new individuals within the new firm will not have a 
link with managers and hence, will not act in their interests. This helps to   64 
eliminate conflicts of interests, which are seen in the principal-agent problem. 
Therefore, businesses will be more effectively directed and controlled leading to a 
better governance structure. Even if the takeover is unsuccessful, the fear of a 
takeover can result in top management and the CEO fearing dismissal if they 
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